In his early years (the late 1980s and early 1990s), President Museveni was well aware of this. The NRM government then actually gave up control of most economic activities and drastically reduced the size of cabinet. However, when Museveni joined electoral politics in 1996, he adopted the strategy of political patronage by rewarding areas and individuals in exchange for support. And as Mwenda observes, “Museveni’s success at consolidating his power and stifling democracy flows from his knack for integrating large chunks of the political class into his vast patronage empire … patronage, typically in the form of government contracts, tenders, and jobs, is his preferred tool and the one that he used to render parliament ineffective.” There is particularly strong evidence that President Museveni has indeed used the creation of new districts to create “a raft of new jobs, each one a patronage opportunity.” This is the very reason, many other critics argue, why many countries across the world, especially in Africa, and in this particular case Uganda, have created many new local administrative units. Museveni’s obvious intentions therefore are contradicted by his allegations on Al-Jazeera.
It can also be argued that the unprecedented multiplication of districts out of the existing ethnicities is intended to weaken the historically existing political structures of these ethnic units in order to bring them closer to the grip of political power from the central government. It will be recalled that one of the major political reforms of the Museveni era was the creation of a new constitution which allowed, among other things, the restoration of Uganda’s traditional kingdoms and chiefdoms as cultural institutions. These were strictly restricted from any political activities, and they are largely no threat to centralized state power.
Another major reform, as explained above, was the introduction of the Local Council (LC) system of local government by which the central government “had both created a system of regular and direct elections at the local level and reassigned local government power from centrally-appointed technocrats to locally elected politicians.” One can assume that these people-chosen local leaders, unlike the restored cultural chiefs and kings, eventually became a threat to the centralized power of government. This could be the possible reason for the diminishing powers of the LCs and their being usurped by government-appointed Resident District Commissioners (RDCs) and Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs). The constitutional highlight of reassigning local government power to locally elected politicians had been reversed. Now the most powerful persons in the district are answerable to the most powerful man in the country, not to the people. District leadership jobs, Mr. President, are not truly democratically competitive.
It can be argued that such political patronage affects government institutions, and the values of the people at local and national levels. The net institutional effect is that state institutions have become “personalised” or “privatised”. “Power and authority are situated in the person, not in the office.”  There are also cases where the creation of districts in Uganda has split one ethnic group into four or more districts for the first time, “with the consequence of psychological separation of people and in some cases conflict, as was the case of the undecided location of the headquarters of Tororo, Terego and Maracha districts in the Bugisu region. In both cases the creation of districts re-shapes the local people’s perceptions of socio-cultural values and loyalty. The districts also become more dependent on the central government, and the client-patron relationship is created and re-enforced.